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The Limits of Privacy:  
Some Reflections on  
Section 8 of the Charter 
Croft Michaelson* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On the 25th anniversary of the proclamation of the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms,1 we would do well to remember how very 
different our legal world was only a quarter-century ago. Police officers, 
acting under writs of assistance, were able at any time of night and day 
to enter homes to search for narcotics if they believed narcotics were on 
the premises, and could search any person found therein. If they suspected 
public washrooms might be used for “indecent” acts, police officers 
would not uncommonly hide themselves behind air ducts and the like, in 
order to surreptitiously observe individuals in washroom stalls, a distasteful 
form of surveillance that degraded both the watched and the watchers. 
And Fontana, in the first edition of his text, The Law of Search Warrants 
in Canada, recounted that defence counsel seldom fully explored the 
use of a search warrant by police officers,2 which no doubt was the case 
because relevant evidence was always admissible even if illegally 
obtained.3 It was a world unrecognizable to those who practise today. 
I was one of those fortunate enough to enter law school shortly after 
the Charter came into effect, and I well remember both the enthusiasm 
with which we debated the ramifications of this new constitutional 
recognition of legal rights, and our sense of uncertainty as to where the 
                                                                                                            
*
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1
 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act (U.K.), 1982, 
c. 11 [hereinafter “the Charter”]. 
2
 James A. Fontana, The Law of Search Warrants in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 1974), 
at vii. 
3
 R. v. Wray, [1970] S.C.J. No. 80, [1970] 4 C.C.C. 1 (S.C.C.), unless the evidence was 
“gravely prejudicial to the accused”, of “tenuous” admissibility, and of “trifling” probative force,  
in which case the trial judge might have a discretion to exclude it: per Martland J., at 17. 
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Charter would take us. The early days did not, however, seem promising. 
I remember that one of my classmates tried to raise the implications of 
the Charter in evidence class on one occasion, and our law professor 
refused to discuss it, telling us that he did not think that the Charter 
would really have much impact. Our experiences in the student legal aid 
clinic seemed to confirm what our law professor was telling us. Although 
we were eager to embrace the Charter and sought to raise it in the 
summary trial courts whenever we could, trial judges seemed reluctant 
to find violations of the Charter and, even when they did, seemed even 
more reluctant to exclude the evidence. We found ourselves wondering 
at times whether the Charter was just another largely toothless Bill of 
Rights4 dressed up in different guise. 
But any fears that the Charter would be given a narrow and constrained 
interpretation were soon put to rest. In Hunter v. Southam,5 Dickson J. 
(as he then was) held that the Charter was a purposive document intended 
to restrain government interference with individual rights and freedoms, 
and as such had to be given a broad and generous interpretation.6 With 
this sweeping statement, it was clear that we were living in revolutionary 
times, and the door was opened to a re-examination of all of the old 
rules and approaches. We were, indeed, in new and uncharted territory. 
The 25th anniversary of the Charter provides a fitting opportunity to 
re-examine the jurisprudence that has followed in the years after Hunter 
v. Southam.7 In the discussion that follows, I will explore the framework 
which has been developed by the Supreme Court to determine whether 
an accused has a reasonable expectation of privacy, and whether there 
has been an unreasonable interference with that privacy interest. I will 
argue that the Court’s current approach to the first question ― whether the 
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy ― is largely adequate to 
the task, but that it is crucial, in addressing novel claims to privacy, that 
we maintain our focus on the underlying values that privacy protections 
seek to promote. With respect to the second question ― whether there 
has been an unreasonable interference with the privacy interest ― I will 
suggest that the Supreme Court has recently introduced some confusion 
and uncertainty into the law concerning administrative and regulatory 
searches. And, finally, I will argue that where the accused successfully 
                                                                                                            
4
 Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44. 
5
 Canada (Combines Investigation Act, Director of Investigation and Research) v. Southam 
Inc., [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hunter v. Southam”]. 
6
 Hunter v. Southam, [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 41 C.R. (3d) 97, at 105-06 (S.C.C.). 
7
 [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 41 C.R. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.). 
(2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 89 
establishes a section 8 violation, the question whether or not to exclude 
the evidence should be decided by weighing the societal interests in 
truth-finding and suppression of crime against the particular privacy 
interest invaded, and will suggest that such a weighing process should 
ordinarily favour the admission of the evidence, save for instances where 
the police deliberately violated the offender’s rights under section 8. 
Any discussion on section 8, however, has to start at the beginning and 
the seminal case of Hunter v. Southam. 
II. HUNTER V. SOUTHAM 
Hunter v. Southam8 involved a challenge to a legislative provision 
under the Combines Investigation Act9 which authorized the Director of 
Investigations and Research of the Combines Investigation Branch to 
enter premises in order to search for and seize any documents that were 
relevant to an inquiry under the Act. The only real limitation on the 
entry was that it could only be made pursuant to a certificate granted by 
a member of the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (“RTPC”), 
who had to be satisfied that the Director reasonably believed that relevant 
documents might be found on the premises. 
A number of important principles were laid down by Dickson J. 
First, he held that section 8 is aimed at protecting the individual’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy, rather than places themselves. He 
then went on to hold that, although the state interest in law enforcement 
can override the individual’s right to privacy, state intrusion can only 
occur if there is prior judicial authorization, given that the Charter gives 
preference to the individual’s right to privacy. In other words, before 
any intrusion can occur, the competing interests of the state and individual 
have to be balanced by a judicial officer, an individual who must be able 
to decide the issue in a neutral and impartial manner. Moreover, the 
standard for judicial authorization, at least where the state’s interest is 
law enforcement, is a credibly based probability that evidence will be 
found as a consequence of the intrusion. Searches conducted without 
prior judicial authorization, warrantless searches, were held prima facie 
unreasonable, with the state bearing the onus of demonstrating why the 
search was reasonable in the circumstances. Finally, any search or 
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 [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 41 C.R. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.). 
9
 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23. 
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seizure, to be found reasonable, must be authorized by a law which itself 
is reasonable, and executed in a reasonable manner. 
The legislative provision at issue in Hunter v. Southam10 was found 
to violate section 8 as it was not a reasonable law. There were two 
fundamental flaws in the legislation. First, certificates granted by a 
member of the RTPC did not amount to prior judicial authorization 
because it could not be said that they were granted by a neutral and 
impartial arbiter. Second, the issuance of a certificate under the Act was 
not based on reasonable and probable grounds that evidence would be 
found, and therefore failed to meet the minimum constitutional standard 
for prior judicial authorization. 
After Hunter v. Southam,11 it was clear that any search carried out 
by agents of the state had to have its basis in some grant of legal 
authority, either through some express legislative provision,12 or under a 
common law rule.13 If there was no lawful authority for a search, the 
search would be illegal and hence unreasonable. It was also clear that 
investigators had to obtain a warrant in order to conduct a search to 
advance the state’s interest in “law enforcement”, provided that it was 
feasible to do so. What was left unexplored was what a “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” encompassed, and although the Court alluded to 
the possibility that some standard other than that set out in Hunter v. 
Southam might suffice to justify a state intrusion where the interests 
were something other than law enforcement, it was left to another day to 
determine what those interests might be. In the years following, the courts 
wrestled with these issues and it is to those issues that I now turn. 
III. WHAT IS A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY? 
Privacy, as many commentators have noted, is a rather elusive and 
malleable concept. What is relatively certain is that privacy is considered 
very important in free and democratic societies; indeed, the right to keep 
some aspects of our lives private is recognized as a fundamental human 
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 [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 41 C.R. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.). 
11
 [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 41 C.R. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.). 
12
 See, e.g., R. v. Grant, [1993] S.C.J. No. 98, 84 C.C.C. (3d) 173 (S.C.C.) ― warrantless 
search of drugs authorized under s. 10 of the Narcotic Control Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-1 [rep. S.C. 1996,  
c. 19, s. 94]. 
13
 See, for example, R. v. Godoy, [1998] S.C.J. No. 85, 131 C.C.C. (3d) 129 (S.C.C.) ― 
warrantless entry and search authorized under the common law Waterfield rule (R. v. Waterfield, 
[1963] 3 All E.R. 659, [1964] 1 Q.B. 164 (C.A.). 
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right in international human rights instruments.14 Defining the scope of 
that right, however, is more problematic. While we all can agree that 
individuals should be entitled to maintain some private sphere from 
which they can exclude others, we must also readily acknowledge that no 
one lives a hermetically sealed existence, free from interaction with others 
and a public sphere of activity. Conduct which is private in one context, 
may well be public in another. The right to privacy, like other rights, can 
be relinquished or abandoned by the privacy claimant, in which case the 
question may well become whether the relinquishment was absolute, or 
limited in its effect to a particular purpose or audience. Determining 
where the public sphere ends and the private begins can be exceedingly 
difficult. As Binnie J. observed in the recent decision of R. v. Tessling,15 
“[p]rivacy is a protean concept.”16 
Even a cursory review of the vast body of literature on privacy and 
its theoretical underpinnings is well beyond the scope of this paper;17 
however, most conceptions of privacy appear to agree that privacy has 
two fundamental characteristics. First, by definition, a right to privacy 
confers on the individual the ability to exclude others from the “private” 
realm, whatever that realm may be. Second, in free and democratic 
societies, privacy is closely tied to the value our society places on the 
individual. We recognize that certain aspects of life are profoundly intimate 
and justify the grant of a right of privacy. Moreover, we recognize that 
each one of us should be permitted the right to control access to certain 
aspects of our lives, because the ability to exclude others is necessary to 
promote our sense of self and actualize our lives as distinct individuals. 
In a sense, we confer a right of privacy on individuals simply because it 
conforms with our society’s ideal of what it means to be an individual. 
As La Forest J. put it in R. v. Dyment:18 
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 See, for example, Article 17(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, December 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, arts. 9-14, Can. T.S. 1976 No. 47, 6 I.L.M. 368, 
which states: “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.” 
15
 [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, 23 C.R. (6th) 207 (S.C.C.). 
16
 R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, 189 C.C.C. (3d) 129, at para. 25 (S.C.C.). 
17
 See Richard B. Bruyer, “Privacy: A Review and Critique of the Literature” (2006)  
43 Alta. L. Rev. 553 for such a review. Bruyer argues that all of the conceptions of privacy set out 
in the literature are grounded on notions of individual liberty, which he rejects in favour of a  
conception of privacy based on the entitlement of persons to equal treatment in respect of dignity 
and autonomy. 
18
 [1988] S.C.J. No. 82, 45 C.C.C. (3d) 244 (S.C.C.). 
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Grounded in man’s physical and moral autonomy, privacy is essential 
for the well-being of the individual. For this reason alone, it is worthy 
of constitutional protection …19 
We should, therefore, not find it surprising that the Supreme Court 
concluded that the purpose of privacy is to promote the dignity, integrity 
and autonomy of the individual.20 
We then have to ask, though, what aspects of life promote the dignity, 
integrity and autonomy of individuals, and therefore fall within the 
“private” sphere. Rather than attempt to list all of the activities that are, 
or may be, private, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized early on in 
the section 8 jurisprudence that there are three distinct zones or realms 
of privacy: privacy as it relates to the person (the body); territorial or 
spatial privacy; and informational privacy.21 
The basis for the first of these, privacy of the body, is readily 
understood, tied in as it is to societal notions of decency and bodily 
integrity. In our society, we place great weight on the right of individuals 
to make decisions as to who will be permitted to have access to their bodies 
and in what manner. Our bodies are who we are, and non-consensual 
invasions of our person will inevitably offend our sense of autonomy 
and diminish our dignity. For this reason, claims to privacy of the person 
have been said to have the greatest claim for protection.22 
The rationale for the second zone of privacy is also easy to understand. 
We need to have private spaces within which we can pursue private 
acts. If individuals are to have a private realm from which they can 
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 R. v. Dyment, [1988] S.C.J. No. 82, 45 C.C.C. (3d) 244, at 254 (S.C.C.). 
20
 See R. v. Plant, [1993] S.C.J. No. 97, 84 C.C.C. (3d) 203, at 212 (S.C.C.), per Sopinka J.:  
“… such investigative practices as videotaping of events in a private hotel room (R. v. Wong 
(1990), 60 C.C.C. (3d) 460, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36, 1 C.R. (4th) 1), and seizure by state agents of a 
blood sample taken by medical personnel for medical purposes (R. v. Dyment, [1988] S.C.J. No. 82,  
45 C.C.C. (3d) 244 (S.C.C.)), have been found to run afoul of the s. 8 right against unreasonable 
search and seizure in that the dignity, integrity and autonomy of the individual are directly 
compromised” (emphasis added). See also R. v. Dyment, [1988] S.C.J. No. 82, 45 C.C.C. (3d) 244, 
at 255 (S.C.C.), per La Forest J. where he states that privacy “is based on the notion of the dignity 
and integrity of the individual”.  
21
 See R. v. Dyment, [1988] S.C.J. No. 82, 45 C.C.C. (3d) 244, at 255 (S.C.C.): 
The first challenge, then, is to find some means of identifying those situations where we 
should be most alert to privacy considerations. Those who have reflected on the matter have 
spoken of zones or realms of privacy: see, for example, Privacy and Computers, the Report 
of the Task Force established by the Department of Communications/Department of Justice 
(1972), especially at pp. 12-14. The report classifies these claims to privacy as those involving 
territorial or spatial aspects, those related to the person, and those that arise in the information 
context. 
22
 R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, 23 C.R. (6th) 207, at para. 21 (S.C.C.). 
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exclude others, one of the easiest ways to recognize that is by demarcating 
the “private” from the “public” through reference to traditional property 
rights. My property is “private”; hence, I can exclude others from it. In that 
sense, property functions as a proxy for the individual’s right to privacy.23 
The boundaries of these two zones of privacy are easy to discern ― 
bodies are bodies and places are places. But even if places may be easy 
to define on the facts of a particular case, it is still necessary to determine 
whether the privacy claimant has a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the particular place. After all, section 8 protects people, not places. If a 
person is lawfully in possession of a place, the answer seems clear that 
he or she is likely to have a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect 
of some aspect of that place.24 But since private property is only a proxy 
for reasonable expectations of privacy, one has to exercise some care in 
the analysis. The boundaries of one’s reasonable expectation of privacy 
and the territorial limits of the property in question may not coincide. 
Thus, I can assert a reasonable expectation of privacy within the confines of 
my house, but not necessarily my driveway.25 And what if one’s connection 
with the place in question is something less than lawful possession? Our 
common experience tells us that not everyone who has some connection, 
however tenuous, with a place can reasonably expect to find privacy 
there. The owner of an apartment building cannot reasonably claim that 
he has an expectation of privacy in an apartment which he has rented to 
another person.26 The furnace repairman cannot be heard to say that he 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in my home simply because he 
happens to be on my premises, or can he? And what about friends and 
family, who are my guests at a dinner party ― do they have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy? What if they reside with me for the weekend? 
Can they then assert that an intrusion into my home trenches on their 
right to privacy and interferes with their dignity, integrity and autonomy? 
These are not easy questions to answer. 
The boundaries of the third zone of privacy, informational privacy, 
are even more difficult to delineate. Not all information about an individual 
necessarily promotes dignity, integrity and autonomy. Some information 
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 R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, 23 C.R. (6th) 207, at para. 16 (S.C.C.). 
24
 R. v. Belnavis, [1997] S.C.J. No. 81, 118 C.C.C. (3d) 405 (S.C.C.) ― driver of motor 
vehicle has reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle; R. v. Lauda, [1999] O.J. No. 2180,  
136 C.C.C. (3d) 358 (Ont. C.A.) ― lessor of farmland has reasonable expectation of privacy in 
posted lands. 
25
 R. v. Lotozky, [2006] O.J. No. 2516, 210 C.C.C. (3d) 509 (Ont. C.A.). 
26
 R. v. Pugliese, [1992] O.J. No. 450, 71 C.C.C. (3d) 295 (Ont. C.A.). 
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pertaining to the individual may be so mundane or innocuous that its 
disclosure could not possibly affect the individual’s dignity, integrity or 
autonomy. Furthermore, the disclosure of some information, such as 
information pertaining to one’s taxable income, may well be required as 
a matter of course for civil society to function properly. And finally, 
some information about the individual, if kept hidden, may actually 
serve to undermine those values which privacy seeks to promote. I am 
thinking here of information concerning criminal acts that may have 
been committed by the individual, which typically will have resulted in 
the denigration of another person’s dignity, integrity and autonomy,  
a point to which I will return to later. 
The challenge then, whether we are speaking of territorial or 
informational privacy, is to decide whether an individual has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the circumstances. How are we to go about 
determining this? The Supreme Court, in the early years, approached 
this question by undertaking a normative analysis that was largely 
disconnected from the actual facts of the case. That is, rather than 
determining whether an individual had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy having regard to all of the circumstances of the case, the Court 
posed questions “framed in broad and neutral terms”27 and asked 
whether individuals in our society should generally enjoy an expectation 
of privacy. The question was not whether the landlord had an expectation 
of privacy in the tenant’s apartment, but whether individuals in society 
should enjoy an expectation of privacy inside apartments. And the question 
was not whether the furnace repairman had an expectation of privacy 
inside my home, but rather whether individuals generally should enjoy 
an expectation of privacy in homes. 
This normative approach was first applied by the Supreme Court in 
R. v. Duarte,28 a decision which surprised many of us at the time. The 
facts of the case are not complex. Duarte met with an informer and 
undercover police officer in an apartment which had been wired to 
intercept and record their conversations, and discussed a cocaine 
transaction. The informer and undercover police officer had both consented 
to the interception of their communications. On these facts, many of us 
thought that the outcome was obvious. Parliament had already sought to 
protect private communications from being surreptitiously intercepted 
                                                                                                            
27
 R. v. Wong, [1990] S.C.J. No. 118, 60 C.C.C. (3d) 460, at 481 (S.C.C.). 
28
 [1990] S.C.J. No. 2, 53 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.). 
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by making it a criminal offence to do so,29 but had expressly exempted 
the interception of private communications from the reach of the criminal 
sanction when one of the parties to the communication had consented to 
the interception.30 Such a provision seemed reasonable and in accord 
with common sense. How could Duarte claim an expectation of privacy 
in his conversation with the informer and undercover police officer, when 
they were free to disclose the content of his conversation to anyone 
else? 
The Crown’s argument found favour with the Ontario Court of 
Appeal,31 but was rejected by the Supreme Court. The question for the 
Supreme Court was not whether Duarte had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his communication with the undercover police officer, but 
rather whether individuals generally in society would expect that their 
private communications with others would not be intercepted by the 
state without prior judicial authorization. As La Forest J. explained a 
few months later in another case, R. v. Wong,32 which applied the same 
type of generalized normative analysis: 
. . . R. v. Duarte approached the problem of determining whether a 
person had a reasonable expectation of privacy in given circumstances 
by attempting to assess whether, by the standards of privacy that 
persons can expect to enjoy in a free and democratic society, the 
agents of the state were bound to conform to the requirements of the 
Charter when effecting the intrusion in question. This involves asking 
whether the persons whose privacy was intruded upon could legitimately 
claim that in the circumstances it should not have been open to the 
agents of the state to act as they did without prior judicial authorization. 
To borrow from Professor Amsterdam’s reflections, supra, at p. 403, 
the adoption of this standard invites the courts to assess whether 
giving their sanction to the particular form of unauthorized surveillance 
in question would see the amount of privacy and freedom remaining to 
citizens diminished to a compass inconsistent with the aims of a free 
and open society. 
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 Then s. 178.11(1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34 provided: “Every one who, 
by means of an electromagnetic, acoustic, mechanical or other device, wilfully intercepts a private 
communication is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for five years.” 
30
 Then s. 178.11(2)(a) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34 provided that s. 178.11(1) 
did not apply to “a person who has the consent to intercept, express or implied, of the originator of 
the private communication or of the person intended by the originator thereof to receive it”. 
31
 R. v. Sanelli, Duarte and Fasciano, [1987] O.J. No. 821, 38 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.). 
32
 [1990] S.C.J. No. 118, 60 C.C.C. (3d) 460 (S.C.C.). 
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 When the intrusion takes the form of unauthorized and surreptitious 
electronic audio surveillance, R. v. Duarte makes it clear that to sanction 
such an intrusion would see our privacy diminished in just such an 
unacceptable manner. While there are societies in which persons have 
learned, to their cost, to expect that a microphone may be hidden in 
every wall, it is the hallmark of a society such as ours that its members 
hold to the belief that they are free to go about their daily business 
without running the risk that their words will be recorded at the sole 
discretion of agents of the state. 
 Accordingly, by the standards of privacy that prevail in a free and 
open society such as our own, Duarte was entitled to claim that 
judicially unauthorized participant surveillance did offend against his 
reasonable expectations of privacy when he engaged in what he had 
every reason to believe was an ordinary private conversation. To have 
held otherwise would have been tantamount to exposing any member 
of society whom the state might choose to target to the same risk of 
having his or her nominally private conversation become the subject of 
surreptitious recordings.33 
R. v. Wong was another surprising case. The accused was alleged to 
have operated an illegal gaming house in a hotel room, to which he had 
invited members of the public by indiscriminately circulating notices at 
public bars and restaurants. The police gathered evidence of the illegal 
gambling enterprise through surreptitious video surveillance of the hotel 
room. In determining whether Wong had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, the question for the majority was not whether Wong had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in these particular circumstances. 
Rather, according to La Forest J., “the question must be framed in broad 
and neutral terms so as to become whether in a society such as ours 
persons who retire to a hotel room and close the door behind them have 
a reasonable expectation of privacy.”34 
There are several problems with the type of normative analysis 
adopted by the Court in both Duarte35 and Wong.36 The first problem is 
that the outcome of any particular inquiry into the existence of a reasonable 
expectation of privacy is largely driven by how one has framed the 
question, rather than the actual facts of the particular case. If we ask a 
question that is very general, we tend to find ourselves talking about 
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 R. v. Wong, [1990] S.C.J. No. 118, 60 C.C.C. (3d) 460, at 478 (S.C.C.). 
34
 R. v. Wong, [1990] S.C.J. No. 118, 60 C.C.C. (3d) 460, at 481 (S.C.C.). 
35
 R. v. Duarte, [1990] S.C.J. No. 2, 74 C.R. (3d) 281 (S.C.C.). 
36
 R. v. Wong, [1990] S.C.J. No. 118, 1 C.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.). 
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privacy generally and get an answer that is different than if we framed 
the question with more specificity. The greater the level of generality to 
the question posed, the more likely it is that one will find a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. So, returning to my example of the repairman in 
my home, we get one answer when we ask whether individuals behind 
closed doors in homes should have a reasonable expectation of privacy, 
and a different one when we ask whether a visiting repairman inside a 
home should have a reasonable expectation of privacy. This starts to 
look like results-driven reasoning. 
A second problem flows from the first. If one adopts an approach 
that is too general and disconnected from the facts of a particular case, 
outcomes are no longer consonant with our common experience and 
societal expectations. One ends up extending privacy protection to 
situations that do not warrant it. For example, La Forest J. describes the 
drug-related conversation in Duarte37 as an “ordinary private conversation”, 
and yet I think most of us would regard the conversation as anything 
but. The drug trade is rife with informers and undercover police officers 
― could Duarte really reasonably expect that his conversation about the 
cocaine transaction would remain private and free from interception by 
the state? 
A generalized approach to normative analysis also risks leading us 
astray from the concern which should lie at the heart of every inquiry 
into reasonable expectation of privacy: would the individual’s dignity, 
integrity and autonomy be advanced or diminished in the instant case by 
validating the privacy claim? The point I am trying to make here is best 
illustrated by the case of R. v. Babinski.38 Babinski sexually assaulted  
a woman, and later broke into her apartment. His victim went to the 
police, and told them that Babinski had said that he would be calling 
her. The police suggested recording the conversation in the hope that 
they would obtain incriminating evidence of the break-in. The victim 
consented to the recording of her conversation with Babinski. Under 
Duarte,39 Babinski’s communication with his victim40 was protected 
under section 8 of the Charter and the consensual recording of the call in 
the absence of prior judicial authorization was a violation of Babinski’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy. Babinski’s conversation with his 
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victim became just another “ordinary private conversation”. And yet one 
might ask how reasonable it is for the perpetrator of a crime to expect 
that his confession to his victim will remain private? One might also ask 
why Babinski’s statements to his victim, acknowledging the break-in, 
should be subject to Charter protection. Babinski had violated his victim’s 
dignity, integrity and autonomy by forcibly violating her reasonable 
expectation of privacy. How can it be that his admission to this effect 
promotes dignity, integrity and autonomy? The simple answer is that it 
does not. The content of Babinski’s communications did not warrant 
protection under section 8, nor did Duarte’s. 
The final problem with a generalized normative approach to the 
determination of reasonable expectation of privacy is that it fails to 
provide police officers and prosecutors with sufficient guidance during 
investigations. Police and prosecutors often confront wildly varying 
factual scenarios and have to make decisions based on their common 
experiences and their understanding of societal expectations. Those who 
are expected to faithfully apply the terms of the Charter  need at least 
some semblance of certainty and predictability from the courts, yet a 
broad and neutral normative analysis provides neither. One is left with 
only vague uncertainty until the question is ultimately framed and decided 
by the Supreme Court of Canada. 
Fortunately, the Supreme Court subsequently abandoned its 
generalized approach to normative analysis, in favour of an approach 
that examined all of the circumstances in deciding whether an individual 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy. In R. v. Edwards,41 the majority 
of the Court decided that the existence of a reasonable expectation  
of privacy would be determined on an assessment of the “totality of 
circumstances”, which would include, for claims made to territorial or 
spatial privacy, circumstances such as: the accused’s presence at the 
time of the search, possession or control of the property or place searched, 
ownership of the property or place, historical use of the property or 
item, ability to regulate access, existence of a subjective expectation of 
privacy and the objective reasonableness of the expectation.42 The 
question thereafter was no longer whether individuals in our society 
generally enjoyed an expectation of privacy in apartments, but whether 
an “especially privileged guest”, who had no authority to exclude others, 
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had a reasonable expectation of privacy when the owner of the premises 
granted the police access.43 The question was no longer whether people 
in automobiles generally had a reasonable expectation of privacy, but 
rather whether a passenger in a car had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in a bag stuffed with stolen clothing, when she did not assert 
any ownership interest in it.44 
The Edwards45 totality of the circumstances test has provided a flexible 
framework that has proven itself well suited to address the varied 
circumstances police and prosecutors face. More importantly, the test 
approaches the assessment of reasonable expectation of privacy in a 
manner that avoids the problems with a normative analysis disconnected 
from the actual facts of the case. Under the Edwards test, the outcome 
of any given fact scenario is likely to be more closely aligned with our 
common experience and societal expectations, and therefore, I would 
suggest, more likely to lead to predictable outcomes that we consider just. 
In the context of informational privacy, the Supreme Court, per 
Sopinka J., adopted an approach somewhat similar to the Edwards46 test 
in R. v. Plant,47 a case concerned with whether an individual held a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in computer records of his electricity 
consumption. In assessing whether the accused had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, Sopinka J. looked to a number of factors: the 
nature of the information itself, the nature of the relationship between the 
party releasing the information and the party claiming its confidentiality, 
the place where the information was obtained and the manner in which 
it was obtained. More importantly, Sopinka J. recognized that not all 
information is entitled to protection under section 8. Taking a purposive 
approach, he held that privacy protection is restricted to information which 
is personal and confidential and serves to promote the individual’s dignity, 
integrity and autonomy: 
. . . in order for constitutional protection to be extended, the information 
seized must be of a “personal and confidential” nature. In fostering the 
underlying values of dignity, integrity and autonomy, it is fitting that  
s. 8 of the Charter should seek to protect a biographical core of personal 
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information which individuals in a free and democratic society would 
wish to maintain and control from dissemination to the state.48 
The Supreme Court in Tessling49 recently adapted the Edwards test 
in order to address reasonable expectations of privacy in the context of 
information privacy. Justice Binnie said that in approaching privacy 
claims in relation to information (which in Tessling was an image of 
heat emanating from the accused’s house), one first must ascertain the 
nature of the information at stake, and determine whether the accused 
had a direct interest in the information. One then asks whether the accused 
had a subjective expectation of privacy in relation to the information, 
and whether that expectation was objectively reasonable. The objective 
reasonableness of an expectation of privacy is determined by examining 
the following factors: the place where the alleged “search” occurred; 
whether the information was in public view; whether the information 
had been abandoned; whether the information was in the hands of third 
parties and, if so, whether it was subject to an obligation of confidentiality; 
whether the investigative technique was intrusive, or objectively 
unreasonable; and whether the information exposed any of the intimate 
details of the accused’s lifestyle, or was information of a biographical 
nature.50 
One can quibble with the relevance of some of these factors. For 
example, one may well ask why the intrusiveness of the investigative 
technique should matter when we are assessing the reasonableness of 
the expectation of privacy. If one has an expectation of privacy in 
information, the objective reasonableness of that expectation should not 
ordinarily be dependent on whether the state has extracted the information 
in an intrusive manner. I would think that this factor, and the extent to 
which the investigative technique itself is objectively unreasonable 
(whatever that means), are best left to the second stage of the section 8 
analysis, the inquiry into whether the search itself is unreasonable. And 
one may also ask why we even bother inquiring whether the accused has 
a subjective expectation of privacy, since the outcome seems largely 
dependent on whether the expectation of privacy was objectively 
reasonable. As Binnie J. aptly observes, the subjective expectation of 
privacy is of only limited import in any inquiry into reasonable expectation 
of privacy: 
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The subjective expectation of privacy is important but its absence should 
not be used too quickly to undermine the protection afforded by s. 8 to 
the values of a free and democratic society. In an age of expanding means 
for snooping readily available on the retail market, ordinary people 
may come to fear (with or without justification) that their telephones 
are wiretapped or their private correspondence is being read. One 
recalls the evidence at the Watergate Inquiry of conspirator Gordon 
Liddy who testified that he regularly cranked up the volume of his 
portable radio to mask (or drown out) private conversations because he 
feared being “bugged” by unknown forces. Whether or not he was 
justified in doing so, we should not wish on ourselves such an 
environment. Suggestions that a diminished subjective expectation of 
privacy should automatically result in a lowering of constitutional 
protection should therefore be opposed. It is one thing to say that a 
person who puts out the garbage has no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in it. It is quite another to say that someone who fears their 
telephone is bugged no longer has a subjective expectation of privacy 
and thereby forfeits the protection of s. 8. Expectation of privacy is a 
normative rather than a descriptive standard.51 
(emphasis in original omitted) 
 
This is clearly correct. While we may be free to relinquish our right 
to privacy, it is not extinguished simply because someone else has told 
us that they are going to regularly invade our privacy. Privacy cannot be 
lost as a result of a forcible taking by another.52 So, I would agree that 
the absence of a subjective expectation of privacy, where it is the result 
of an actual or feared forced deprivation of privacy, cannot be used as 
the basis to deny someone a claim to protection under section 8. To this 
I would add the obvious point that the presence of a subjective 
expectation of privacy conversely does not automatically confer section 
8 protection. At the end of the day, the question for determination on the 
first stage of every section 8 claim is simply whether our societal values 
are such that we are prepared to acknowledge that, in the circumstances 
of the case, the accused had a valid and enforceable expectation of 
privacy. In this sense, the section 8 inquiry still remains a normative 
one, but it is one that is always informed by the specific facts of the 
instant case. 
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The result in Tessling53 turned on the fact that the information at 
issue did not form part of the accused’s biographical core of personal 
information or reveal any intimate details of the accused’s lifestyle. It 
was, therefore, not entitled to constitutional protection under section 8: 
External patterns of heat distribution on the external surfaces of a 
house is not information in which the respondent had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. The heat distribution, as stated, offers no 
insight into his private life, and reveals nothing of his “biographical 
core of personal information”. Its disclosure scarcely affects the 
“dignity, integrity and autonomy” of the person whose house is subject 
of the FLIR image (Plant, at p. 293).54 
As Binnie J. acknowledges here, not all information promotes dignity, 
integrity and autonomy. Indeed, some information, such as information 
relating to criminal acts, undermines these values. The man who beats 
his spouse, the purveyor of child pornography, the drug trafficker who 
manufactures and distributes methamphetamine, none of these can 
legitimately claim that information concerning their conduct should 
remain private to promote their dignity, integrity and autonomy. In many 
instances, however, they may be able to shelter such information behind 
other proper privacy claims. Although the spouse beater may have no 
legitimate privacy claim in relation to the fact that he beats his spouse, 
he can nonetheless shelter himself behind his general right to privacy in 
his home. 
I would argue, though, that technologies which reveal information 
pertaining to criminal acts, without also trenching upon legitimate privacy 
claims, do not interfere with any reasonable expectation of privacy. For 
example, technologies that reveal the existence of a marijuana grow 
operation inside a home, without intruding into the individual’s 
biographical core of personal information or the intimate details of  
his or her life, do not give rise to viable section 8 claims. Thus, the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, in the recent decision of R. v. Cheung,55 
was correct to hold that use of a digital recording ammeter to monitor 
electrical consumption in a home did not violate section 8, even though 
the information derived therefrom was probative of the fact that a 
marijuana grow operation was being conducted inside the house. 
Similarly, I would argue that the use of dogs to sniff for information of a 
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criminal nature ― drugs, explosives, and the like ― do not trench on 
the values which section 8 seeks to promote. 
In coming to grips with novel technologies which may permit the 
police to gather information about some activities, it will always be 
crucial to ask whether the information in question, if protected from 
disclosure, serves to advance the values of dignity, integrity and autonomy. 
If it does not, privacy protection should not be provided under section 8. 
A purposive approach should always be central to the first stage of the 
analysis. 
IV. WHAT IS A REASONABLE SEARCH? 
Once an accused demonstrates that he or she held a reasonable 
expectation of privacy which was the subject of state intrusion, the 
question then becomes whether that intrusion was reasonable. There are 
several bases on which a search or seizure might be found unreasonable. 
The particular intrusion in question might not be authorized by law, 
because there is no specific statute or common law rule permitting the 
search.56 The police may have overstepped the boundaries of the authority 
conferred upon them.57 Or, the police may have used unreasonable force 
in executing a search warrant. 
As set out above, Hunter v. Southam58 established that, where the 
state interest is law enforcement, a reasonable search requires prior 
judicial authorization where feasible, and the standard which must be 
met before a search or seizure can be permitted is one of credibly based 
probability. Of course, implicit in the Hunter v. Southam standard was 
that a warrantless search might be reasonable, if it was not possible to 
obtain prior judicial authorization in the circumstances, or if the state 
interest was something other than law enforcement. 
Four years after Hunter v. Southam,59 the Court had to consider 
whether the Hunter standards were applicable to searches of the person 
at the border. Such searches were permissible under the Customs Act60 
without prior judicial authorization, on a standard less than reasonable 
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grounds to believe that the person was in possession of contraband.61 
The Court held, per Dickson C.J.C., that individuals entering Canada 
had a reduced expectation of privacy and, given the state interest in 
maintaining border integrity, searches of the person did not have to comply 
with the strict standards laid down in Hunter v. Southam. However, the 
Court also observed that departures from the Hunter v. Southam standards 
“will be exceedingly rare”.62 
In the years following Hunter v. Southam63 and Simmons,64 the 
Supreme Court has been very reluctant to depart from the Hunter 
standards, at least where the privacy interest is high and the police are 
pursuing a criminal investigation. Indeed, the court has only generally 
been prepared to find warrantless searches reasonable, where the police 
were acting pursuant to some lawful authority in compelling and urgent 
circumstances. Thus, in R. v. Grant, the Court decided that a warrantless 
search for drugs under section 10 of the Narcotic Control Act65 was 
reasonable, but only if there was an “imminent danger of the loss, removal, 
destruction or disappearance of the evidence sought in a narcotics 
investigation”.66 In R. v. Godoy,67 the warrantless entry and search of an 
apartment in response to a “911” call was held reasonable, given the 
compelling public interest in preserving life and health.68 In the context 
of searches of the person conducted pursuant to the long-standing 
common law power of search as an incident of arrest, the Court held, in 
R. v. Golden,69 that strip searches in the “field” will only be reasonable 
“where there is a demonstrated necessity and urgency to search for 
weapons or objects that could be used to threaten the safety of the 
accused, the arresting officers or other individuals”.70 
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However, it seems that, even in the context of criminal investigations, 
departures from the Hunter v. Southam71 standards may be justified if 
the reasonable expectation of privacy is low and the intrusion is minimal.72 
And, where the state interest is not the pursuit of a criminal investigation, 
but rather the investigation of regulatory offences, the Court has been 
more willing to relax the Hunter v. Southam standards. At least that 
seemed to be the case until the decision of R. v. Jarvis,73 which has, in 
my view, added some uncertainty to what seemed a relatively well-settled 
area of the law. 
In a developed and complex society, where many activities are 
necessarily regulated in the broader public interest, governments obviously 
need some means of ensuring that individuals are actually complying 
with the regulatory obligations imposed upon them. Many regulations 
would be rendered ineffective if government had no power to conduct 
random inspections or compel the production of books and records that 
one might be required to maintain. The Supreme Court has, therefore, 
recognized that some types of search and seizure in the regulatory 
sphere will not be subject to the Hunter v. Southam74 standards. The 
rationale for this is two-fold: individuals typically hold a lower expectation 
of privacy in respect of regulated activities; and the regulatory standards 
would be practically unenforceable if investigators were required to 
demonstrate the existence of reasonable and probable grounds as a pre-
condition to engaging their powers of search and seizure. In Thomson 
Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Director of Investigation and Research, 
Restrictive Trade Practices Commission),75 La Forest J. stated: 
. . . the degree of privacy the citizen can reasonably expect may vary 
significantly depending upon the activity that brings him or her into 
contact with the state. In a modern industrial society, it is generally 
accepted that many activities in which individuals can engage must 
nevertheless to a greater or lesser extent be regulated by the state to 
ensure that the individual’s pursuit of his or her self-interest is compatible 
with the community’s interest in the realization of collective goals and 
aspirations. In many cases, this regulation must necessarily involve the 
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inspection of private premises or documents by agents of the state. The 
restaurateur’s compliance with public health regulations, the employer’s 
compliance with employment standards and safety legislation, and the 
developer’s or homeowner’s compliance with building codes or zoning 
regulations, can only be tested by inspection, and perhaps unannounced 
inspection, of their premises. Similarly, compliance with minimum wage, 
employment equity and human rights legislation can often only be 
assessed by inspection of the employer’s files and records.76 
Thomson Newspapers77 was concerned with whether the compelled 
production of documents in the context of an investigation into possible 
offences under anti-combines legislation violated section 8 of the Charter. 
The decision can be somewhat difficult to follow because each of the 
five members of the panel provided reasons. However, the decision was 
released at the same time as the Court’s decision in R. v. McKinlay 
Transport Ltd.,78 a case involving compelled production of information 
and documents under the Income Tax Act.79 Reading both cases together, 
it is clear that a majority was of the view that compelled production of 
documents is a seizure under section 8, and that, while the individual’s 
expectation of privacy may be high in relation to “criminal” investigations, 
it will be less so in the regulatory or administrative sphere. A majority 
of the Court also acknowledged that intrusions into expectations of 
privacy will be reasonable in the regulatory sphere, if they are necessary 
to ensure compliance with the regulatory framework and not too intrusive. 
In essence, the Court in each case balanced the state interest in 
enforcement of the regulatory scheme against the degree of expectation 
of privacy held in the circumstances. Given the relatively low expectation 
of privacy, the state interest in enforcement prevailed. 
What was critical to the outcome in each case was the characterization 
of the nature of the investigative provisions at issue. In McKinlay 
Transport,80 all were agreed that the Income Tax Act81 and the powers of 
compulsion were regulatory in nature, and it was impracticable to insist 
on compliance with the Hunter v. Southam82 standards. Tax officials 
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would be unable to effectively investigate and audit taxpayers if they 
were required to have reasonable and probable grounds. In Thomson 
Newspapers,83 the minority was of the view that the provisions in question 
were “criminal” or “quasi-criminal”, and therefore subject to the Hunter 
v. Southam standards. Justice La Forest, however, rejected this position, 
pointing out that offences are often included in regulatory schemes to 
promote compliance; that is, they are introduced for instrumental reasons. 
For La Forest J., there was a fundamental distinction between regulatory 
offences and “true crimes”; it was only where the latter arose that the 
individual enjoyed a heightened expectation of privacy warranting 
application of the Hunter v. Southam standards. As he explained: 
 To recapitulate, the relevance of the regulatory character of the 
offences defined in the Act is that conviction for their violation does 
not really entail, and is not intended to entail, the kind of moral reprimand 
and stigma that undoubtedly accompanies conviction for the traditional 
“real” or “true” crimes. It follows that investigation for purposes of the 
Act does not cast the kind of suspicion that can affect one’s standing 
in the community and that, as was explained above, entitles the citizen 
to a relatively high degree of respect for his or her privacy on the part 
of investigating authorities. This does not, of course, mean that those 
subject to investigation under the Act have no, or no significant, 
expectation of privacy in respect of such investigations. The decision 
of this court in Hunter v. Southam Inc., supra, makes clear that they 
do. But it does suggest that the degree of privacy that can reasonably 
be expected within the investigative scope of the Act is akin to that 
which can be expected by those subject to other administrative and 
regulatory legislation, rather than to that which can legitimately be 
expected by those subject to police investigation for what I have called 
“real” or “true” crimes.84 
So, Thomson Newspapers85 and McKinlay Transport86 seemed to 
stand for the general proposition that regulatory or administrative searches 
and seizures would typically be found reasonable, even if warrantless, 
so long as the power in question was necessary to ensure and promote 
compliance with the regulatory scheme in question and was not overly 
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invasive. The jurisprudence, thereafter, was generally consistent with 
this approach. Inspections of business premises in a regulated industry, 
although characterized as “searches” under section 8, were upheld as 
reasonable, given that they were necessary to investigate complaints and 
ensure compliance.87 Powers compelling individuals to appear before 
investigators inquiring into possible infractions of securities regulations, 
to testify under oath and produce documents and records, were found 
reasonable given the low expectation of privacy in business records held 
by those who chose to enter highly regulated industries.88 And in Del 
Zotto v. Canada,89 the Supreme Court agreed with Strayer J.A. in the 
Federal Court of Appeal90 that an inquiry power under the Income Tax 
Act,91 permitting compelled testimony from witnesses and compelled 
productions of documents, was not unreasonable, even if the inquiry 
was convened in contemplation of a potential prosecution. In coming to 
this conclusion, Strayer J.A. emphasized the regulatory nature of the 
Income Tax Act,92 the fact that conduct such as tax evasion is made an 
offence under the Act for strictly instrumental reasons, the minor level of 
intrusion and the reduced expectation of privacy. Justice Strayer stated: 
 There cannot be the exaggerated claims to privacy connected with 
the administration of the Income Tax Act which the appellants assert. 
The Act requires all manner of disclosure. The taxpayer must, for 
example, disclose: his place of residence; his age; his social insurance 
number; his marital status or whether he is living common law; his 
sources and amounts of income; his dependants, their ages and possible 
physical conditions if handicapped; the amounts and objects of his 
charitable or political donations, if he is to claim tax credits; whom he 
employs and entertains if he seeks to deduct the costs as business 
expenses; and details of his pension arrangements. If he is employed 
he must disclose many of these details not only to Revenue Canada but 
also to his employer so that mandatory tax deductions can be made. 
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 A subpoena duces tecum is not a major intrusion of privacy as 
compared to a search.93 
The Supreme Court, however, also made it clear in the years after 
Thomson Newspapers94 and McKinlay Transport95 that the determination 
whether a given regulatory search is reasonable is ultimately a balancing 
exercise. Where the individual’s expectation of privacy is low, the state 
interest in enforcing compliance with regulatory standards will ordinarily 
prevail. But where the expectation of privacy is high, the Court will be 
more inclined to insist on strict compliance with the Hunter v. Southam96 
standards. Thus, in Baron v. Canada,97 per Sopinka J., the Court decided 
that a search of private premises to gather evidence for the prosecution 
of a taxpayer under the Income Tax Act98 did not justify a departure from 
the Hunter v. Southam standards.99 This makes sense. Although the 
taxpayer may only have a relatively low expectation of privacy in records 
and documents themselves as against the Canada Revenue Agency, 
there are obviously other significant privacy interests engaged when tax 
investigators enter private premises, and it is appropriate for the authorities 
to obtain a warrant in order to intrude upon these latter interests. 
Justice Sopinka did, however, make one curious statement in the 
course of deciding Baron.100 He suggested that the purpose of the search, 
the gathering of evidence for a tax prosecution, was a relevant factor in 
holding the tax investigators to the Hunter v. Southam101 standards. This 
is confusing and seems incorrect. McKinlay Transport102 had affirmatively 
decided that the Income Tax Act103 was regulatory legislation, and, as  
La Forest J. noted, tax offences were created for “instrumental” reasons. 
The expectation of privacy in relation to the books and records that one 
is expected to maintain under the Income Tax Act104 is low. It cannot be 
the case that the taxpayer’s expectation of privacy varies depending on 
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the purpose for which those records are sought by tax officials. The 
expectation of privacy remains the same, whether the basis for the 
investigation is random spot monitoring, or information from a disgruntled 
ex-spouse which gives rise to grounds to believe that the taxpayer has 
been running personal expenses through his company for years. As long 
as the search remains within the “investigative scope” of the Income Tax 
Act, there is a reduced expectation of privacy in books and records. 
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé added a further twist in Comité paritaire,105 
when she suggested in obiter that an inspection power under a regulatory 
scheme can be used to enter premises only up to the point that investigators 
have reasonable and probable grounds to believe that an offence has 
been committed.106 Thereafter, the investigators must presumably resort 
to warrants to enter premises and search for evidence. This strikes me as 
a strange result, and perhaps only justified on the basis that since the 
investigators have reasonable and probable grounds, they may as well apply 
for warrants in any event. But one might ask what is accomplished by 
imposing a requirement of judicial authorization in such circumstances, 
for an application for prior judicial authorization serves little purpose if 
the legislator has already provided investigators with inspection powers. 
A simple example will suffice to make the point. Suppose investigators 
think that they have reasonable and probable grounds to believe that a 
regulatory offence has been committed and apply for a warrant. In such 
circumstances, the state interest in enforcing the regulatory scheme 
would ordinarily result in the issuance of a warrant permitting them 
entry. Yet, if the justice should find that the investigators do not have 
sufficient reasonable and probable grounds, then the investigators can 
resort to their powers of inspection and enter the premises. In each case, 
the investigators can enter the premises and intrude upon what is a 
relatively minimal expectation of privacy. The Hunter v. Southam107 
standards serve no practical purpose, if investigators can resort to a power 
permitting warrantless entry in the absence of reasonable grounds. I see 
no reason why investigators should have to suspend powers of inspection, 
simply because they may have reasonable and probable grounds to believe 
an offence was committed. 
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Jarvis108 has added to the confusion, for although the case itself 
ultimately turns on a question of statutory construction concerning the 
ambit of certain powers under the Income Tax Act,109 some language 
used by the Court may suggest that, even in the regulatory sphere, 
investigators have to surrender audit or inspection powers if they are 
intent on gathering evidence for prosecution purposes. 
Tax officials have fairly broad inquiry powers under the Income Tax 
Act.110 Under section 231.1, they can, for any purpose related to the 
administration or enforcement of the Act, enter without warrant any 
premises, except a dwelling house, to inspect, audit or examine the 
books and records of the taxpayer, as well as any other document that 
may be relevant to the determination of the amount owing by the 
taxpayer. Under section 231.2, the Minister of Revenue may, again for 
any purpose related to the administration or enforcement of the Act, 
require that any person provide information or documents. And, under 
section 231.3, a warrant may be obtained, if there are reasonable grounds 
to believe that an offence under the Act has been committed, to enter 
and search any place for evidence pertaining to the offence. 
Jarvis111 was concerned with whether the powers under sections 
231.1 and 231.2 could be used to further a prosecutorial investigation 
without infringing Charter rights. Admittedly, the case is complicated 
somewhat by the fact that the accused challenged the provisions at issue 
under both section 7 and section 8 of the Charter, and much of the 
decision could be said to turn on the extent to which the protections 
against self-incrimination under section 7 were triggered as a result of 
certain utterances and productions that were compelled under sections 
231.1 and 231.2. However, the Court made some observations that 
would seem directly applicable to the assessment of the reasonableness 
of the search under section 8. 
The Court in Jarvis112 ultimately concluded that the broad powers of 
inquiry could not be used to build a prosecution case against an accused, 
even though the Income Tax Act113 was a regulatory statute and the 
taxpayer’s expectation of privacy in the type of records and documents 
sought by tax officials is low. It is important to understand how the 
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Court reached this conclusion. The Court’s interpretation of Parliament’s 
intent is, in my view, the determinative factor in the case. The Court’s 
reasoning was that, since Parliament made it possible for the Minister to 
obtain warrants to investigate offences where reasonable and probable 
grounds exist, then Parliament must have intended that the warrantless 
powers be restricted in their use: 
The existence of a prior authorization procedure where the commission 
of an offence is suspected creates a strong inference that the separate 
statutory inspection and requirement powers are unavailable to further 
a prosecutorial investigation.114 
The Court was also of the view that there had to be some separation 
between the audit and investigative functions because the individual’s 
liberty interest is at stake during an investigation: 
 Although the taxpayer and the CCRA are in opposing positions 
during an audit, when the CCRA exercises its investigative function 
they are in a more traditional adversarial relationship because of the 
liberty interest that is at stake. In these reasons, we refer to the latter as 
the adversarial relationship. It follows that there must be some measure 
of separation between the audit and investigative functions within the 
CCRA.115 
Curiously, although the Court appeared to have found that Parliament 
must have intended that warrants be obtained once reasonable and probable 
grounds existed to believe that an offence under the Act  had been 
committed, the Court did not follow L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s obiter comments 
in Comité paritaire116 and require that tax officials actually obtain a 
warrant at that stage. Rather, the Court said that tax officials only had to 
relinquish their inspection and requirement powers once their inquiry 
engaged the “adversarial relationship” between the taxpayer and the 
state, that is, once the predominant purpose of a given inquiry became 
the determination of penal liability.117 The Court reasoned that requiring 
that auditors obtain warrants whenever reasonable and probable grounds 
exist would be too problematic: 
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Even where reasonable grounds to suspect an offence exist, it will not 
always be true that the predominant purpose of an inquiry is the 
determination of penal liability. In this regard, courts must guard 
against creating procedural shackles on regulatory officials; it would 
be undesirable to “force the regulatory hand” by removing the possibility 
of seeking the lesser administrative penalties on every occasion in which 
reasonable grounds existed of more culpable conduct.118 
Now, if Jarvis119 is seen simply as a matter of statutory construction, 
I have no great difficulty with the result, even if I think that the 
reasoning given in support of the interpretation of Parliament’s intent is 
rather strained and results-driven. If sections 231.1 and 231.2 must be 
restricted as a matter of statutory interpretation to audits, then use of 
those powers in furtherance of prosecutorial investigations oversteps the 
bounds of what the statute permits. Use of the powers in such 
circumstances, therefore, is not authorized as a matter of law, and 
amounts to an illegal search. 
The real question, though, is whether Jarvis120 represents something 
more than this, and whether the statements made by the Court have 
application beyond the case itself. Is it the case that whenever there is a 
prior authorization procedure available, that no resort can be made to 
other investigative powers of search or seizure if the adversarial relationship 
has been engaged? Moreover, does Jarvis stand for the principle that the 
Hunter v. Southam121 standards will apply whenever the liberty interest 
of the subject is engaged in the course of a regulatory investigation, that 
is, whenever investigators shift their focus to the determination of penal 
liability? And if that is the case, how does one reconcile that with the 
results in Thomson Newspapers122 and Del Zotto,123 where the very purpose 
of each inquiry was to determine whether offences had been committed? 
Jarvis124 raises many questions. All we can say for certain at the 
present time is that, even in the regulatory context, investigators will 
need to be very cautious before using warrantless powers of search and 
seizure to build a case for prosecution purposes. 
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V. SHOULD THE PRIVACY CLAIM BE VALIDATED BY  
EXCLUDING THE EVIDENCE? 
Of course, for every person accused of a crime, there is little comfort 
in successfully alleging a violation of the right to privacy, if it does not 
result in the exclusion of evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter. 
The decision whether to exclude evidence arising from a section 8 
violation is simplified, in that the court will typically not need to consider 
the first step of the well-known Collins125 analysis, whether the breach 
implicates the fairness of the trial. This follows from the fact that the 
seizure of real, non-conscriptive evidence is typically the result of a section 
8 violation, and such evidence does not affect the fairness of the trial. 
Decisions whether to exclude evidence obtained as a consequence 
of a violation of the right to privacy turn on the second and third steps of 
the Collins126 analysis, the seriousness of the breach and the effect that 
exclusion would have on the repute of the administration of justice. 
Again, this really calls for the court to engage in yet another balancing 
exercise, weighing the infringement of the privacy interest against the 
state interest in effective law enforcement. 
At the second step of the Collins127 inquiry, one assesses the seriousness 
of the breach by considering factors such as the level of intrusiveness, 
the degree of expectation of privacy that was held by the accused, the 
good faith of the police, and whether reasonable and probable grounds 
existed in any event.128 One then goes on, at the third step of the Collins 
inquiry, to consider whether vindication of the Charter right will extract 
“too great a toll” on the truth-seeking function of the criminal trial.129 
In many instances, and particularly those where the evidence is 
probative of a serious offence, the administration of justice should 
ordinarily favour admission of the evidence, rather than exclusion. We 
recognize that privacy rights can be subordinated to the state interest in 
law enforcement. That is why privacy can be overridden to gather 
evidence of crimes. And I think that this is so because privacy rights are 
not the only means by which we promote dignity, integrity and autonomy. 
Conduct is usually criminalized because it causes harm to others, and 
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offends their rights to dignity, integrity and autonomy. The prosecution 
of offences, in a very real sense, validates the rights of those who were 
victimized by the accused. The individual who has committed an offence 
should not evade criminal liability for his acts, by being permitted to 
shield himself behind the rights he has himself invaded. So, the state 
interest in law enforcement should ordinarily prevail in the face of a claim 
of privacy infringement, unless the conduct of the state is so egregious 
that admission of the impugned evidence will actually bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute. 
The conduct of the police, as recognized by Doherty J.A. in 
Kitaitchik,130 will often then be determinative of the result. If the police 
acted in “good faith”, in the sense that they believed they were acting 
pursuant to some grant of lawful authority, the evidence will ordinarily 
be admitted. If the police acted in “bad faith”, in the sense that they 
deliberately infringed the accused’s rights, the evidence will often be 
excluded because of the effect that judicial condonation of the violation 
would have on the administration of justice.131 
What is problematic, however, is when the courts start examining 
police conduct and find an absence of good faith when there was no 
deliberate violation of the accused’s privacy interests. The Supreme  
Court in R. v. Mann132 stated that good faith cannot be claimed if the 
Charter violation was committed on the basis of a police officer’s 
unreasonable error or ignorance as to the scope of his or her authority.133 
Yet this assumes that the legal rules propounded by the courts provide 
sufficient certainty and predictability, which is far from being true. 
Navigating the complexities of Charter jurisprudence is often a challenging 
task, and it can be exceedingly difficult for the police to determine 
whether a given course of action is Charter-compliant. This is particularly 
so when the police are required to make rapid decisions in fluid and 
highly charged environments, far removed from the calm detachment of 
a courtroom. 
The current approach to the assessment of “good faith”, however, 
leads to curious rulings to the effect that the police unreasonably interpreted 
the scope of their authority, when appellate judges cannot even agree 
among themselves whether the police conduct amounted to a Charter 
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violation in the circumstances. So, in R. v. Buhay,134 the police were 
ultimately found to have acted unreasonably, yet three members of the 
Manitoba Court of Appeal did not even think that the accused had 
established a reasonable expectation of privacy. In R. v. Law,135 the 
officer’s conduct was said to be “serious”, although two members of  
the New Brunswick Court of Appeal thought there was no Charter 
violation. And in the recent decision of R. v. Harris,136 the police officer 
was said to have displayed an unreasonable ignorance as to the scope of 
his authority, even though one member of the panel, in dissent, thought 
that the actions of the police officer complied with the Charter. If highly 
capable jurists can find themselves in disagreement on whether certain 
police conduct amounts to a Charter violation, it seems unfair to 
characterize the police actions as “unreasonable” and to hold the police 
to a standard of perfection which appellate judges cannot even achieve. 
We would do well in future to abandon the concept of “good faith”, 
and simply ask whether a violation of a Charter right was deliberate or 
wilful, since those are the types of violations that truly offend the rule of 
law and risk bringing the administration of justice into disrepute. Honest 
mistakes as to the scope of lawful authority, even if they might be said 
to be unreasonable, do not warrant exclusion of the evidence, since they 
do not reflect a lack of regard for the individual’s constitutional rights. 
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